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Abstract—The integration of social networking concepts into
the Internet of Things (IoT) has led to the so called Social Internet
of Things paradigm, according to which the objects are capable
of establishing social relationships in an autonomous way with
respect to their owners. The benefits are those of improving the
network scalability in information/service discovery when the IoT
is made of huge numbers of heterogeneous nodes, similarly to
what happens with social networks among humans.
Within this scenario, in this paper we focus on the problem of
understanding how the information provided by the other mem-
bers of the social IoT has to be processed so as to build a reliable
system on the basis of the behavior of the objects. We define a
subjective models for trustworthiness management starting from
the solutions proposed for P2P networks. Accordingly, each node
computes the trustworthiness of its friends on the basis of its own
experience and on the opinion of the friends in common with the
potential service providers. We employ a feedback system and
we combine the credibility and centrality of the nodes to evaluate
the trust level. Preliminary simulations show the benefits of the
proposed models towards the isolation of almost any malicious
nodes in the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Internet of Things (IoT) [1], everything real be-
comes virtual, which means that each person and thing has a
locatable, addressable, and readable counterpart on the Inter-
net. These virtual entities can produce and consume services
and collaborate toward a common goal. The car driver knows
about the status of her car and of the roads towards her
destination thanks to the autonomous communications of the
sensors and actuators in her car with those installed in other
vehicles encountered along the path, and those installed along
the road. These scenarios are possible with an intense inter-
action between objects and related services. Indeed the most
fascinating applications are those where the things collaborate
to realize a complex service to improve the quality of life of
people. For instance, in [2] the authors introduce the idea of
objects able to participate in conversations that were previously
only available to humans. Analogously, the research activities
reported in [3] consider that, being things involved into the net-
work together with people, social networks can be built based
on the Internet of Things and are meaningful to investigate the
relations and evolution of objects in loT. This has also brought
to the convergence of IoT and social network paradigms,
as analyzed in [4], which depicts the scenarios where an
individual can share the services offered by her/his smart
objects with her/his friends or their things through widespread
social networks. In [5] and [6], explicitly, the Social IoT (SIoT)
concept is formalized, which is intended as a social network
where every node is an object capable of establishing social
relationships with other things in an autonomous way with
respect to its owner, with the potentials to solve problems of
network navigability and information/service discovery when
the IoT is made of huge numbers of heterogeneous nodes.
Until now, in these proposals the focus has been directed
to the definition of the relationships and interactions among
objects and to the definition of a reference architectures and
protocols. But the paradigm still lacks in some basics aspects
such as understanding how the information provided by the
other members have to be processed so as to build a reliable
system on the basis of the behavior of the object. In this
work we address this uncertainty and analyses strategies to
establish trustworthiness among nodes in the social IoT. The
challenge is of building a reputation-based trust mechanism
for the IoT that can deal effectively with certain types of
malicious behavior that intend to mislead other nodes. With
these problems in mind, we propose a subject trust model with
the idea to construct a system of trustworthiness management
of the objects which should drive the consumption of the
services and information towards trusted nodes. The major
contributions of the paper are the followings: definition of
the problem of trustworthiness management in the social
IoT; definition of a trust model where each node computes
the trustworthiness of its friends on the basis of its own
experience and on the opinion of the friends in common with
the potential service provider; evaluation of the benefits of the
trustworthiness management in the IoT.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Social Internet of Things
The idea to use social networking elements in the Internet
of Things to allow objects to autonomously establish social
relationships is gaining popularity in the last years. The
driving motivation is that a social-oriented approach is expect
to put forward the discovery, selection and composition of
services and information provided by distributed objects and
networks that have access to the physical world. The proposed
social-oriented approach is characterized by the capabilities of
the objects to autonomously establish social relationships of
different kinds ( [2], [5], [6]). Within the resulting object social
network, a key objective will be to publish information and
services, find them, and discover novel resources to support
the implementation of complex services and applications. This
can be achieved in a trusty and efficient way by navigating
a social networks of “friend” objects, instead of relying on
typical Internet discovery tools that cannot scale to billions of
future devices.
In this paper, without losing of generality, we refer to
the social IoT model proposed in [6] (we use the acronym
SIoT to refer to it). According this model, a set of forms of
socialization among objects are foreseen. The parental object
relationship is defined among similar objects, built in the
same period by the same manufacturer (the role of family
is played by the production batch). Moreover, objects can
establish co-location object relationship and co-work object
relationship, like humans do when they share personal (e.g.,
cohabitation) or public (e.g., work) experiences. A further type
of relationship is defined for objects owned by the same user
(mobile phones, game consoles, etc.) that is named ownership
object relationship. The last relationship is established when
objects come into contact, sporadically or continuously, for
reasons purely related to relations among their owners (e.g.,
devices/sensors belonging to friends); it is named social object
relationship.
B. State of the Art in P2P Networks
The closest works to the topic addressed in this paper are
those on the trustworthiness management in P2P networks.
To calculate a peer trustworthiness, a system has to store the
reputation information, encourage and decide how to share
these information and utilize them to efficiently calculate a
trustworthiness value.
There are different approaches that can be used to store
trustworthiness information. As described in [7], all informa-
tion can be stored in a centralized storage to foster sharing
and managing information; however, it easily leads to a single
point of failure. In [8] information is distributed in storage
peers; this approach reduces the network overhead but is not
able to deal with the case of a malicious node or a node with a
low trust value being a storage peer. In the rater-based storage
approach [9], each peer stores trustworthiness information
about the peers it has observed and can then decrease the
possibility of tampering with the reputation information.
For a reputation system is important to incentive the peers
to cooperate and solve some well-known problems. A solution
is the one proposed in [10], where a peer can buy and sell
reputation information to the other peers and loses credit
if it behaves maliciously. When a peer decides to share its
information, the system has to cope with how effectively share
them. This problem can be handled in different ways: local
share, part share and global share.
Once the information are collected, it is important to use
a computation system that is able to extract a reliable value
of the trustworthiness. A simple mechanism consists to use an
arithmetic average [11] of all the reputation values a node has
received. Other models consider to weight the reputation value
in different ways: in [12], the authors use different weights for
acquaintance and stranger peers, while in [13] the weight is
chosen based on the last reputation value a node has received;
the algorithm in [14] considers the similarity between two
peers in terms of released feedback to weight the reputation
value. In [8], the authors assume the existence of a digraph
of social links between peers, where reputation values are
assigned to the link based on the transaction between the peers
at the end of the link.
III. NOTATION AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
In our modelling, the set of nodes in the SIoT is P =
{p1, ..., pi, ...pM} with cardinality M , where pi represents
a generic node. In our problem setting, let the network
be described by an undirected graph G = {P , E}, where
E ⊆ {P × P} is the set of edges, each representing a relation
between a couple of nodes. Let Ni = {pj ∈ P : pi, pj ∈ E}
be the neighborhoods of node pi, namely the nodes that share
a relation with node pi, and Kij = {pk ∈ P : pk ∈ Ni ∩Nj}
be the set of common friends between pi and pj .
Let Sj be the set of services that can be provided by
pj . The reference scenario is represented by pi requesting a
particular service Sh. We assume that the Service discovery
component in the SIoT receives the request of this service from
pi and returns to it a set of nodes Zh = {pj ∈ P : Sh ∈ Sj}
that are able to provide the service Sh. For each of this
potential service providers, the Service discovery component
returns a set of edges Rij =
{
paijp
b
ij
}
, which represents
the sequence of social links that constitute the selected path
from pi to pj in the SIoT. At this point, the Trustworthiness
management component is expected to provide the important
function of listing the trust level of any node in Zh. This is
the objective of our work.
IV. SUBJECTIVE TRUST MANAGEMENT MODEL
A. Basic elements
In the above scenario, we envision a subjective trustwor-
thiness model, where each node pi computes the trustwor-
thiness of its Ni friends on the basis of its own experience
and on the opinion of the Kij friends in common. We refer
to this trustworthiness with Tij , i.e., the trustworthiness of
node pj seen by node pi. If pi and pj are not friends then
the trustworthiness is calculated by word of mouth through
a chain of friendships. A node trustworthiness is determined
through evaluation of its behaviour performed by the nodes in
the network that interacted with it. Such reputation reflects
the degree of trust that other nodes in the social network
have on the given node on the basis of their past direct
(direct interactions) or indirect (through intermediate nodes)
experiences. To this we identify major important factors that
have been derived by similar ones used in P2P networks
trustworthiness algorithms:
• A feedback system allows a node pi to provide an
evaluation of the service it has received by the provider
pj . Feedback is represented by f lij , which refers to each
transaction l and can be expressed either in a binary way
(f lij ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., pi rates 1 if it is satisfied by the service
and 0 otherwise), or using values in a continuous range
(f lij ∈ [0, 1]) to evaluate different levels of satisfaction.
• The total number of transactions between two nodes,
indicated by Nij , that enables the model to detect if two
nodes pi and pj have an abnormally high number of
transactions.
• The credibility of node pi, indicated as Cij , represents
a key factor in evaluating the information (feedback
and trust level) provided by the nodes. It can assume
the values in the range [0, 1] where 1 represents full
credibility for the node.
• The transaction factor ωlij indicates the relevance of
transaction l between node pi and node pj . It is used to
discriminate important transactions, ωlij = 1, from irrele-
vant ones , ωlij = 0, and can be used as a weight for the
feedback. This parameter avoids nodes to build up their
trustworthiness with small transactions and then become
malicious for an important one. In addition can be used to
discriminate the functionality of the transactions, so that
a node can be trusted only for a certain type of service.
To these, we add other two key factors that exploit the
main features of the social network among the objects:
• The relationship factor Fij indicates the type of rela-
tion that connects pi with pj and represents a unique
characteristic of the SIoT. It is useful to either mitigate
or enhance the information provide by a friend. Table
I shows the values of the relationship factor for every
relation type, where higher value indicates higher trust-
worthiness. This is a possible setting that we use in this
paper on the basis of the following reasoning. However,
other values can be used as well if justified by different
principles. Between two objects that belong to the same
owner and then are linked by a OOR, it is very unlikely
to find a malicious node and for this reason the highest
factor value is assigned to this kind of relationship.
Similar reasoning has been followed for the CLOR and
the CWOR, since they are established between domestic
objects or objects of the same workplace, respectively.
SORs are relationships established between objects that
are encountered occasionally and for this reason are given
with a smaller factor. Finally, the POR are the most risky,
since they are created between objects of the same brand
but that never met and depend only on the model object.
If two nodes are tied by two or more relationships, the
strongest relation with the highest factor is considered.
• The notion of centrality of node pi, indicated as Rij
(with respect to pj). It provides a peculiar information of
the social network since if a node has many relationships
or is involved in many transactions, it is expected to
assume a central role in the network. As described in
[15], centrality is “related to group efficiency in problem-
solving, perception of leadership and the personal satis-
faction of participants”.
Another important characteristic of the members of IoT is
also considered:
TABLE I
TRANSACTION FACTOR
Ownership Object Relationship OOR 0.9
Co-Location Object Relationship CLOR 0.8
Co-Work Object Relationship CWOR 0.8
Social Object Relationship SOR 0.6
Parental Object Relationship POR 0.5
TABLE II
COMPUTATION CAPABILITIES
Class 1 Smartphone, tablet 0.8
Class 2 Set top box, smart video camera 0.6
Class 3 Sensor 0.4
Class 4 RFID 0.2
• The computation capabilities of an object, namely their
intelligence Ij . It is a static characteristic of the objects
since it does not vary over the time but depends only on
the type of the object considered. Indeed, we expect that a
smart object has more capabilities to cheat with respect to
a “dummy” object, and that leads to riskier transactions.
To this, we identify four different class of objects, where
each class is defined on the basis of the computation
capabilities, and assign to each class a different value, as
shown in Table II: Class1 is assigned to mobile objects
with great computational and communication capabilities,
such as smartphones, tablets, and vehicle control units;
Class2 is assigned to static objects with significant com-
puting capabilities; to this class belong object such as
displays, set top boxes, smart video cameras; Class3 is
assigned to objects with only sensing capabilities, that
is, any object capable of providing a measure of the
environment status. Finally, Class4 is assigned to the
RFID-tagged objects.
B. Subjective Trustworthiness
In this approach, each node stores and manages the feed-
back needed to calculate the trustworthiness level locally. This
is intended to avoid single points of failures and infringement
of the values of trustworthiness. We first describe the scenario
of node pi and pj adjacent, i.e. when they share a social
relationship, and we define Tij , namely the trustworthiness
of node pj seen by pi, as follows
Tij = αRij + βIj + γO
dir
ij + δO
ind
ij (1)
where α+β+γ+δ = 1 to keep the trustworthiness value
between 0 and 1 and to tune the parameters with different
weights. Node pi computes the trustworthiness of its friends
on the basis of their centrality Rij , of their intelligence Ij
and of its own direct experience and on the opinion of the
Kij friends in common with node pj , namely Odirij and Oindij
respectively.
The centrality of pj is defined as follows
Rij = |Kij |
/
|Ni| (2)
and represents how much the node pj is central in the
“life” of pi. This aspect helps to prevent malicious nodes that
build up a lot of relationships to have high values of centrality.
If two nodes have a lot of friends in common, this means
they have similar evaluation parameters about building rela-
tionships, even more if we consider the possibility to terminate
a relationship with a very low value of trustworthiness.
When a node pi needs the trustworthiness of a node pj ,
it checks the last direct transactions and determines its own
opinion as described in the following
Odirij =


Fij
if Nij = 0
(
log(Nij + 1)
1 + log(Nij + 1)
)
(ǫOlonij + χO
rec
ij )+
+
(
1
1 + log(Nij + 1)
)
Fij
if Nij > 0
(3)
where two opinion are calculated, using different size of
the observation temporal windows: Olon for the long-term
opinion and Orec for the short-term opinion and ǫ+χ = 1 so
that their values can be set to control the weight of the long
and short-term opinions. It is important to note how, even if
no transactions are available for node pi to judge the node pj
(Nij = 0), a first evaluation has been obtained considering
the type of relation that links the two nodes. When other
information becomes available from the transactions between
pi and pj (Nij > 0), the relationship factor starts to lose its
importance and eventually only the opinion built up with past
transactions is considered.
The long and short-term opinion can be expressed as
Olonij =
Llon∑
l=1
f lijω
l
ij
/ Llon∑
l=1
ωlij (4)
Orecij =
Lrec∑
l=1
f lijω
l
ij
/ Lrec∑
l=1
ωlij (5)
Llon represents the long-term opinion temporal window
and Lrec the short-term opinion, with Llon > Lrec and l
indexes from the latest transaction to the oldest ones. Moreover
the transaction factor ωij is used to weight the feedback so
to distinguish important transactions from unimportant ones.
Indeed, the short-term opinion is useful when evaluating the
risk associated with a node, i.e., the possibility for a node to
start acting in a malicious way or oscillating around a regime
value after building up its reputation. It would make possible to
suddenly spoil the service requesting nodes. In fact, the long-
term opinion is not sensitive enough to detect this scenario
since it needs a long time to change the accumulative score.
The indirect opinion can be expressed as
Oindij =
|Kij |∑
k=1
(
CikO
dir
kj
)/ |Kij |∑
k=1
Cik (6)
where each of the Kij friends in common gives its own
opinion of the node pj . All these opinions are then weighted
by pi based on the credibility Cik of the node that provides
it. The credibility is calculated as
Cik = ηO
dir
ik + µRik + ρ(1− Ik) (7)
where η+µ+ρ = 1. From (7) we see that Cik depends on
the direct experience between the two nodes, on their centrality
and on their intelligence. Its computation requires adjacent
nodes to exchange information on their direct opinions and
list of friends, which may be an issue. To reduce the traffic
load, it is possible for node pi to request the indirect opinion
only to those nodes with a high credibility value.
(2) - (7) allows us to finally compute the subjective
trustworthiness in (1). Indeed, for the idea itself of subjective
trustworthiness, all the formula we have shown in this section
are not symmetric and in general Tij 6= Tji.
If the node that requests the service pi and the node the
provide it pj are not close, i.e. are not in a direct relationship,
the computation of all the trustworthiness values can be
done by multiplying all the trustworthiness values between
adjacent nodes in the considered route from the requester to
the provider and can be calculated as
T ′ij =
j−1∏
d=i
Td,d+1 (8)
At the end of each transaction, pi assigns a feedback
f lij to the service received. In the case of nodes pi and pj
adjacent, pi directly assigns a feedback f lij to pj and also to
the friends in Kij that have contributed to the calculation of
the trustworthiness providing Odirik according to the following
f lik =
{
f lij if Odirkj ≥ 0.5
1− f lij if Odirkj < 0.5
(9)
The reference node pk receives a feedback according
with the opinion value it suggested to pi, to reward/penalize
it for its advice. In the case of more than one degree of
separation, the intermediary nodes can propagate the feedback
up to the provider, only if the previous node, i.e. the node
that propagates the feedback, has a credibility greater than a
threshold.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Simulation Setup
To conduct our performance analysis, we would need
mobility traces of a large number of objects. Since this data is
not available to date, we resorted on the mobility model called
Small World In Motion (SWIM) [16] to generate the needed
traces. However, the output of the SWIM model is a trace of
the position of humans. We then assume that each user owns a
TABLE III
SETTING OF WEIGHTS DURING SIMULATIONS
Parameter Description Value
α weight of the centrality 0.15
β weight of the object characteristic 0.15
γ weight of the direct opinion 0.4
δ weight of the indirect opinion 0.3
ǫ weight of the long-term opinion 0.5
χ weight of the short-term opinion 0.5
η weight of the direct opinion in the credibility 0.7
µ weight of the centrality in the credibility 0.15
ρ weight of the intelligence in the credibility 0.15
set of things that are connected to the SIoT and that during any
movement the user carries half of these objects and leaves the
others at home. Objects that stay at home create co-location
relationships. Every node belongs to a specific model, so that
objects of the same model share a parental object relationship.
The other relationships are created on the basis of the owners
movements.
We decide to run the experiment with about 800 nodes,
considering that each person possesses an average of 7 objects.
Two different behaviors can be considered in a social network:
one is always benevolent and cooperative so that we call
the relevant node social nodes. The other one is a strategic
behavior corresponding to an opportunistic participant who
cheats whenever its advantageous for it to do so; we call
them malicious nodes. The percentage of malicious nodes
is denoted by mp and it is set by default to mp = 25%.
Malicious node behavior can be further divided in collusive
and non-collusive. A node with a non-collusive behavior
provides bad services and false feedback; it can occasionally
choose to cooperate in order to confuse the network. We
denote with mr the percentage of time in which these nodes
behave maliciously (by default mr = 100%). In a collusive
environment, malicious nodes create groups that cooperate to
grow each other trustworthiness; we suppose, for simplicity,
that a group of malicious nodes is identified by nodes tied
with a OOR, so that for mp = 25% the number of collusive
groups is set to 32 groups.
At the start of each transaction, the simulator chooses
randomly the node requesting the service, and a certain
percentage of nodes that can provide the service. The re-
sponse percentage is denoted by res and is set to 5% in
our experiments. The malicious node can then be the node
requesting the service, the node providing the service or the
node providing its opinion about another node. Table III shows
the values for the weights have been used during simulations.
Additionally, the number of transaction in the long-term (Llon)
and short-term opinions (Lrec) have been set to 50 and 5,
respectively. Finally, each object randomly belongs to one of
the computation capabilities classes.
After a node chooses the provider of the service on the
basis of the highest computed trustworthiness level, it send
to it the service request. Depending on how the SIoT model
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Fig. 1. Transaction success rate
is implemented, the service can be delivered either through
the nodes that discover the service, i.e., the social network is
also used to transmit the service requests and responses on top
of the existing transport network (overlay structure) or hop-
by-hop trough the existing communication network, i.e., the
requester and the provider directly communicate (non-overlay
structure). In the latter case, a malicious node can alter the
service only if it is the provider. In the first case, a malicious
node can interfere with the deliver of the service even if it
is in the route from pi to pj since it is asked to forward the
service request to pj and the response back pi.
B. Simulation Results
We define the transaction success rate as the ratio between
the number of successful transactions and the total number of
transactions. Fig. (1) shows the success rate in non-collusive
and collusive scenarios and using and not using an overlay
network. The case in which a trust model is not used is also
presented. We can observe how in the collusive scenario, the
behavior of the subjective approach is almost equal to the
non-collusive case, i.e., this approach is immune to this kind
of attacks. This arises from the idea itself of a subjective
approach; indeed, when a node requires the trustworthiness
values of a member inside a collusive group, the only infor-
mation it needs to know from other nodes, and that can than
be malicious, are those related to the indirect opinion (eq.
(6)), since all other information are stored locally in the node
itself. These information are weighted with the credibility of
the node that provides them (eq. (7)) that depends only on a
node own experience.
We want now to show the robustness of our approach
according to the malicious nodes concentration. All these
experiments are run after 11000 casual transactions in the
network so that the system is in a steady state and then
we perform 100 additional transactions to study the system
behavior in response to the different value of mp. We study
the behavior of the system with different values of the concen-
tration of malicious nodes in both non-collusive and collusive
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case (fig. 2) and for overlay and non-overlay structure; we note
that there are only slightly differences between the different
configurations, namely our approach is resistance to collusive
behavior and and it is able to isolate malicious nodes in the
route; however in our approach the error percentage never
exceed the 15%.
So far, we demonstrated how the proposed approaches
deal against malicious behavior. We are now interested to
evaluate the runtime overhead and how they scale with respect
to the number of nodes. In the subjective model, every node
stores the information about the trust value locally. When a
node needs to know the trustworthiness of another node, it
uses the information about its own experience and asks to
its friends for their opinion. These operations are replicated at
each hop during the discovery of the nodes that can provide the
service. The request for friends’ opinion can be accomplished
by asking to all of them (flooding) or only to that friends that
have a trustworthiness above a certain threshold. The runtime
overhead is then strictly correlated to the number of hops
between requester and provider. The results about runtime
overhead for different number of nodes and 100 transactions
in this case are shown in fig. 3.
If we deeply analyze this behavior, we have to consider
that service discovery and trustworthiness computation can be
carried out at the same time. Moreover, in the simulations, we
have considered the service providers are uniformly distributed
over the network, while it has been proved that friends share
similar interests, the so-called homophily [17], so that it is
highly probable to find a service in the friends list. These
observations can reduce the runtime overhead in our approach,
but, unfortunately, at this time we do not have enough infor-
mation to take them into account in the simulations.
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